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After nearly sixty years of failing to program artificial intelligence (AI), it is now time to grow it using 
an enactive approach instead.  Critically, however, we need to ensure that it matures with a “moral 
sense” that will ensure the safety and well-being of the human race.  Consciousness and conscience 
can lead the way towards creating safe and cooperative machine entities. 
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1 Introduction 
Almost sixty years after the Dartmouth Summer Research proposal [1], it may finally be possible 
“to find how to make machines use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve kinds of problems 
now reserved for humans, and improve themselves.”  What initially seemed a fairly simple problem in 
symbolic logic turned into a nearly bottomless quagmire which prevented growth beyond closed and 
completely specified micro-worlds.  The “frame problem” quickly grew from a formal AI problem [2] 
to the more general philosophical problem of how entities deal with the unbounded nature of context 
and complexity in the real world [3].  Similarly, Harnad’s grounding problem [4] initially seemed 
mitigated by embodiment [5], but the problems of meaning and understanding [6][7][8][9] eventually 
shoaled on Kant’s natural purposes and Aristotle’s teleology.  Intentionality seemed a solution but 
devolved into arguments about extrinsic [10][11], derived [12] or merely “as-if” intentionality [13].   
While Rodney Brooks tried to use his subsumption architecture [14] “to build complete creatures 
rather than isolated cognitive simulators” [15], he had to abandon the approach saying [16]: 
Perhaps it is the case that all the approaches to building intelligent systems are just 
completely off-base, and are doomed to fail. Why should we worry that this is so? Well, 
certainly it is the case that all biological systems are: 
• Much more robust to changed circumstances than our artificial systems. 
• Much quicker to learn or adapt than any of our machine learning algorithms 
• Behave in a way which just simply seems life-like in a way that our robots never do. 
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Perhaps we have all missed some organizing principle of biological systems, or some 
general truth about them. Perhaps there is a way of looking at biological systems which will 
illuminate an inherent necessity in some aspect of the interactions of their parts that is 
completely missing from our artificial systems. 
Thus, we argue, it is only by returning to biology – Varela’s re-enchantment of the concrete [17] – 
that progress can be made. 
2 Enactive Artificial Intelligence 
The enactive paradigm was initially conceived as an embodied and phenomenologically informed 
alternative to mainstream cognitive science [18] that grew out of biological autonomy and autopoiesis, 
the minimal organization of living systems [19][20].  As explained by Froese and Di Paolo [21], the 
enactive approach consists of a core set of ideas, namely autonomy, sense-making, emergence, 
embodiment, and experience, which find novel applications in a diverse range of disciplines such as 
biology, phenomenology, artificial life, social science, robotics, psychology, and neuroscience.  
Defining autonomy as the organizational closure necessary for (and the self-reference inherent in) the 
process of self-production allows for the creative enaction of a meaningful world through identity 
constitution and applies equally well to biological systems (the immune and nervous systems, single-
cell and multi-cellular organisms), social systems and mechanical systems.  Better yet, this approach 
has a lot to say about social interaction forming the dynamics constitutive of both individual agency 
[22][23] and social cognition [24] and thus runs the gamut "from cell to society and back again". 
Traditional robots and AI programs remain composed of “an externally defined collection of 
components that we have merely chosen to designate as an ‘agent’ by convention” [21] with arbitrary 
choices distinguishing the system from the environment [25] and which “only have meaning because 
we give it to them” [12].  In contrast, an enactive system is organized in such a way that its activity is 
both the ‘cause and effect’ of its own autonomous organization.  It has an essentially self-constituted 
identity, because its own generative activity demarks what is to count as part of the system and what 
belongs to the environment, and meaning and understanding are generated relative to that active 
identity.  Indeed, Weber and Varela [26] have gone so far as to propose “a basic revision of the 
understanding of teleology in biological sciences” by “accepting that organisms are subjects having 
purposes according to values encountered in the making of their living” and thus have an 
intrinsic/immanent teleology arising from their biological autonomy and biological individuality. 
Searle [6] can only be answered when a system is formed by deep causal connections with the 
environment intertwining identity and cognition [27].  Programmed-in knowledge and actions provide 
only the shallowest and most brittle referents for the symbol structures that systems must manipulate.  
Brooks tried to program creatures but evolutionary methods allow robots to learn instead.  Law and 
Miikkulainen’s approach [28] “explicitly rejects built-in task-specific knowledge” and “leaves the 
entire structure of the processing machinery up to evolution” -- focusing on “learning the relation 
between sensors and effectors” tabula rasa rather than manually adding ever-increasing knowledge.  
Di Paolo [29][30][31][32] focused on “organismically-inspired” robotics and reproduced homeostatic 
adaptation to inversion of the visual field and other sensorimotor disruptions.  Oudeyer [33][34][35] 
tackled autonomous mental development with “The Playground Experiment” while Demiris and 
Dearden [36] ran the gamut from motor-babbling to hierarchical learning by imitation. 
3 Structure and scaffolding vs. tabula rasa 
Unfortunately, current self-organizing robotics has perhaps focused far too much on a tabula rasa 
approach.  As argued by Pinker [37], human beings start as anything but a blank slate.  The massive 
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computing power of evolution has “programmed in” all sorts of useful structures ranging from our 
attention being grabbed when we spot a snake [38] to our innate moral sense [39][40][41][42][43].  
And while morality predictably evolves [44], selfishness predictably evolves first [45] – so it is clearly 
in our best interests to figure out how to reliably pass moral structures on to our mind children. 
Similarly, self-organizing robotics has not ventured far into the necessary realm of lifelong 
learning [46][47].  We have developed many machines that have learned to move in an incredibly 
lifelike fashion [48] but they are primarily reactive with virtually no high-level control, prediction or 
on-line reasoning.  Now is the time, therefore, that we should be talking about implementing 
functional consciousness on top of their effectively unconscious but robust learning capabilities.  
Sensor readings can be used to create a grounded virtual reality that such a consciousness could 
control and live in exactly as human selves do [49][50][51][52]. 
4 Consciousness and Conscience 
Autopoiesis completes Hofstadter’s Strange Loop [53], allows the cognitive self to come to the 
physical mind [54] and even gives traction on the hard problem of consciousness [55].  As suggested 
previously [56], we believe this is best done via blackboard operating system similar to Hofstadter’s 
CopyCat [57] or LIDA [58] based upon Baars’ Global Workspace model of consciousness [59].  
Consciousness then runs as a process to detect anomalies, learn, and generally act like the Governing 
Board of the Policy Governance model [60] to create a consistent, coherent and integrated narrative 
plan of action to meet the goals of the larger self per Dennett’s narrative model of self [61].   
We should maintain most of the low-level evolved features of human consciousness like automatic 
subjective referral of the conscious experience backwards in time [62][63] but enhance transparency 
wherever possible.  Humans are far too prone to illusory agency with sub- and supra-liminal priming 
enhancing experienced authorship [64] and even inducing false illusions of self-authorship [65][66].  
And we should certainly not replicate the fact that our conscious logical minds are constantly self-
deceived to enable us to most effectively pursue what appears to be in our own self-interest [67][68].  
It would also be particularly helpful if machine moral judgments were products of, based upon, and 
correctly retrievable by conscious reasoning – as opposed to the human case [69][70] – based upon the 
social psychologists’ functional definition of morality [71] reinforced by sensory incentives promoting 
Haidt’s pillars of morality [72] as well as instrumental goal fulfillment for self and others.  Of course, 
autopoietic systems will have functional analogues of pain and emotions [73] and cognitive and time 
limitations will necessarily create numerous examples, such as when one falls in love, where the 
subconscious/emotional systems will overrule or dramatically alter the normal results of conscious 
processing without the consciousness being aware of the fact [74]. 
Successfully implementing consciousness and conscience should place us well on the way towards 
creating safe and cooperative machine entities. 
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